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THE POLICY RESPONSE TO THE
SMOKING AND LUNG CANCER
CONNECTION IN THE 1950s AND 1960s*
V IRG IN I A BERR IDGE
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine,
University of London
A B S T R ACT. A key current concern is how scientiﬁc knowledge may inform policy in relation to major
environmental and health concerns. There are distinct schools of analysis about this relationship between
science and policy. They stress rational relationships ; denial and delay ; or the role of networks. History is
important in modifying such perspectives : smoking policy in the 1950s and 1960s is the case study here. The
initial response in the 1950s to the link between smoking and lung cancer was in part conditioned by the role
of the tobacco industry and the ﬁnancial importance of tobacco : the British tobacco industry had closer
relationships with government than the American one, and did not rely on public relations. Public health
interests worked with the industry. But politicians were concerned also about the ﬂuidity of the epidemio-
logical evidence ; the dangers of stirring up further pressure over air pollution ; the ﬁnancial and ideological
implications of health education and its location ; and the electoral dangers of intervening in a popular mass
habit. In the 1960s the British and American medical reports stimulated the growth of a public health
‘policy community ’. The initial political considerations began to weaken and these years marked the
beginning of a new style of public health.
I
A key current concern is how scientiﬁc knowledge may inform policy in relation
to major environmental and health concerns. The demand for ‘evidence based
medicine’, ‘evidence based practice ’, and ‘evidence based policy ’ has its own
history. One recent lineage came from the US, Canada, and the Netherlands in
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Institutes of Health Washington DC in November 2004. Thanks are due to participants in the con-
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the 1960s through the rise of clinical epidemiology.1 In Britain, there has been a
diﬀerent history. The post-war redeﬁnition of the ideas of social medicine had a
twin legacy in the ‘new public health’ on the one hand, and, on the other, in the
rise of health services research and the dominance of the randomized controlled
trial (RCT) as the gold standard of medical and scientiﬁc evidence.2 The rise of
evidence can also be related to the ‘customer contractor ’ changes in government
research funding in the 1970s, initiated by the 1972 Rothschild Report.3
There are distinct schools of thought about how the relationship between
science/evidence and policy or practice operates or should operate. These can be
categorized under three main tendencies : evidence based or rational arguments ;
the journalist school ; and science policy/sociology of scientiﬁc knowledge (SSK)
approaches.4 The rationalist argument is what has been called the ‘engineering ’
model of research impact on policy. Its proponents argue that all that is needed
are technical adjustments to make the relationships work, that improvements in
process are what is needed, rather than a more fundamental critique. Underlying
this model are positivist models of science, the assumption that knowledge can
have an impact in a value-free way.5 Analogous but more narrowly channelled
approaches to the science/policy relationship appear in the journalist school. The
term ‘ journalist ’ means practised by journalists, and embodying a way of looking
at the world which often characterizes media agendas on science and policy. Here
again, a relationship between science/research and policy is seen as desirable, but
perhaps in a more partisan way. When some hiatus occurs in the relationship, the
interpretation is in terms of conspiracy. The interruption is seen in terms of
‘delay ’ and blame is attached to key participants. This ‘heroes and villains ’
school of analysis is a conventionally accepted mode, even in academic circles, of
looking at the nature of response to public health issues. Some analysis of AIDS
provides a recent example, also responses to BSE and developments in alcohol
policy.6
The third main school can be broadly categorized as network analysis, but the
ﬁeld is complex and there are diﬀerent tendencies within it. One such is the SSK
which has undergone rapid development over the past twenty or so years. Here
1 J. Daly, Evidence based medicine and the search for a science of clinical care (Berkeley and New York, 2005),
pp. 20–48.
2 V. Berridge, D. Christie, and E. M. Tansey, eds., Public health in the 1980s and 1990s : decline and rise ?
(London, 2006).
3 V. Berridge, ‘ Introduction: making health policy; networks in research and policy after 1945’, in
V. Berridge, ed.,Making health policy ; networks in research and policy after 1945 (Amsterdam, 2005), pp. 5–36.
4 V. Berridge and B. Thom, ‘Research and policy: what determines the relationship?’, Policy
Studies, 17 (1996), pp. 23–34; V. Berridge and J. Stanton, ‘Science and policy: historical insights ’, Social
Science and Medicine, special historical issue, 49 (1999), pp. 1133–8.
5 A. Haines and R. Jones, ‘ Implementing ﬁndings of research’, British Medical Journal (BMJ), 308
(1994), pp. 1488–92.
6 For this view of AIDS, see R. Shilts, And the band played on : politics, people and the AIDS epidemic
(London, 1988) ; and alcohol, G. Edwards et al., Alcohol policy and the public good (Oxford, 1994).
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the concept of actor networks in science is important.7 Network theories have also
been developed with a great degree of sophistication within science policy
analyses. In fact analysing policy networks has become a dominant approach for
the study of policy making processes in Britain, Europe, and North America.
Such approaches emphasize the interaction and patterns of association between
actors in diﬀerent policy areas. Networks have been one of the most discussed
and contested terms in political science.8 Richardson and Jordan developed the
idea of the ‘policy community ’, focusing on what they called ‘ the government,
civil service–pressure group network ’.9 The relationship between government
departments and external bodies is what matters, in this interpretation; policy
formulation takes place in stable subsystems comprising government agencies and
outside groups. The whole system is compartmentalized such that relationships
between government and external groups vary for each policy area. Marsh and
Rhodes, using studies of UK policy making, have diﬀerentiated between ‘policy
communities ’ and ‘ issue networks ’.10 The overall view is that policy communities
are small, formal, highly focused, and centralized policy groupings, while issue
networks are more diﬀuse, informal, with less power and more diverse interests.
So far as health policy is concerned, Wistow has stressed the role of ‘profession-
alized networks ’, a network dominated by a single profession, in this case
medicine. The dominant role of the medical profession is a theme in many health
policy analyses, although there is little speciﬁcally on public health.11
How do these schools of analysis manifest themselves for smoking policy?
Archival material has been used to help make the ‘ journalist ’ case, and the history
has been entwined with advocacy for current policy positions. British smoking
policy provides examples in Peter Taylor’s book, Smoke ring, and David Pollock’s
Denial and delay : the political history of smoking and health, 1951–1964: scientists,
government and industry as seen in the papers at the Public Records [sic]Oﬃce.12 Pollock’s
7 M. Nicolson, ‘Heterogeneity, emergence and resistance: recent work in the sociology of labora-
tory science’, in G. Lawrence, ed., Technologies of modern medicine (London, 1994), pp. 111–19.
8 K. Dowding, ‘Model or metaphor? A critical review of the policy network approach’, Political
Studies, 43 (1995), pp. 136–58; G. Jordan, ‘Sub government, policy communities and networks: reﬁlling
the old bottles? ’, Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2 (1990), pp. 319–38; R. A. W. Rhodes, ‘Policy networks:
a British perspective ’, Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2 (1990), pp. 293–317.
9 J. J. Richardson and A. G. Jordan, Governing under pressure : the policy process in a post-parliamentary
democracy (Oxford, 1979), p. 41 ; A. G. Jordan and J. J. Richardson, British politics and the policy
process (London, 1987).
10 D. Marsh and R. A. W. Rhodes, eds., Policy networks in British government (Oxford, 1992) ; D. Marsh
and R. A. W. Rhodes, ‘Policy communities and issue networks: beyond typology’, in Marsh and
Rhodes, eds., Policy networks, pp. 249–68.
11 G. Wistow, ‘The health service policy community: professionals pre-eminent or under chal-
lenge? ’, in Marsh and Rhodes, eds., Policy networks, pp. 51–74: C. Ham,Health policy in Britain : the politics
and organization of the National Health Service (London, 1992) ; R. Klein, The new politics of the National Health
Service (3rd edn, London, 2001).
12 P. Taylor, Smoke ring : the politics of tobacco (London, 1984) ; D. Pollock, Denial and delay : the political
history of smoking and health, 1951–1964: scientists, government and industry as seen in the papers at the Public Records
[sic] Oﬃce (London, 1999).
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book covers the period of this article.13 The chapter headings for the book present
the interpretation of denial and delay. ‘Chapter 1. Pressure for a government
statement, 1951–1954; Chapter 2. Neutralizing the MRC ﬁndings 1954–1957.
Chapter 3. Masterly inactivity, 1957–1961 ’, and goes through to ‘Chapter 6. The
start of modern tobacco control, 1963–1964. ’14 The framework here is one of
delay and conspiracy, of heroes and villains, and represents the ‘Whig history’ of
medicine, the assumption of value-free scientiﬁc truth, and the notion of progress
towards a correct course of action. This is a dominant interpretation of smoking
policy overall. In recent years activism in smoking has focused on archival work
to a degree which has so far been little appreciated in the British historical pro-
fession.15 Such work, using industry archives, has mainly researched policy making
in the 1980s and 1990s in the US, Europe, and Asia and has tended to present a
universal, American dominated history, with little appreciation of national policy
diﬀerences or the changing objectives and strategies of policy over time.
Political scientists have also used the smoking story to illustrate the role of
networks in policy making. One of the most extensive discussions of this point
of view is in Melvyn Read’s Ph.D. thesis and subsequent articles and book on
the politics of tobacco.16 Read segments the smoking story into a case study of
a ‘producer network ’ of industry interests with links into allied government de-
partments ; and an ‘ issue network’ of anti tobacco organizations and interests also
with links into relevant government departments, chieﬂy health. Read uses an
historical approach but proceeds primarily through published documentation
and interviews to make the argument. In this analysis the science is taken as a
given orthodoxy and the main focus is on the operation of what are seen as rival
networks over time, concentrating on the years after 1971 rather than earlier.
Other studies of smoking policy also take an ‘ interest group’ approach.17
Historians can have an eﬀect on the debates on evidence and policy through
challenging the assumptions made by the political lobbies and reﬁning the models
13 Pollock is the former director of the anti tobacco organization ASH (Action on Smoking and
Health) and was commissioned to research and write the history after his departure from the organ-
ization. Interview with David Pollock by the author 11 Mar. 1999.
14 Contents page for Pollock, Denial and delay, p. vii.
15 For examples of this strong interest in history and its raw materials, see House of Commons
Health Committee, Second Report, The tobacco industry and the health risks of smoking, I : Report and
Proceedings of the Committee (London, 1999–2000), 27–I, pp. lxxx–lxxxi; J. Collin, K. Lee, and A. B.
Gillmore, ‘Unlocking the corporate documents of British American tobacco: an invaluable global
resource needs radically improved access ’, Lancet, 363, 29 May 2004, pp. 1746–7.
16 M. Read, ‘The politics of tobacco’ (Ph.D. thesis, Essex, 1989) ; M. Read, ‘Policy networks and
issue networks: the politics of smoking’, in Marsh and Rhodes, eds., Policy networks ; M. Read, The
politics of tobacco : policy networks and the cigarette industry (Aldershot, 1996).
17 See for example, M. Calnan, ‘The politics of health: the case of smoking control ’, Journal of Social
Policy, 13 (1984), pp. 279–96; G. T. Popham, ‘Government and smoking: policy making and pressure
groups’, Policy and Politics, 9 (1981), pp. 331–47. The most recent historical study, Matthew Hilton’s
Smoking in popular British culture, 1800–2000 (Manchester, 2000) has a brief study of post-1945 policy
making. Its focus is mainly on the cultural implications of smoking and the cult of the ‘ liberal indi-
vidual ’, which is discussed below.
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through which social scientists present their case. The former operate from the
perspective of the present : the models used by the latter fail to take account of
complexity and of change over time. The case of smoking policy and its history in
the 1950s and 1960s in the UK oﬀers an opportunity to present a case study of
such an historical contribution. Indeed it is imperative to do so, given the domi-
nance of archivally based ‘ journalist ’ analyses of smoking policy compiled by
researcher activists in recent years.
I I
The early history of the smoking and lung-cancer connection is well known and
has been recounted in a number of diﬀerent histories.18 Concern was roused by
the gradual increase in the incidence of cancer ; a change in the balance of the
sexes, towards men; and the increasingly important role of lung cancer. The
greatest increase in lung cancer came in males over forty-ﬁve, where the incidence
increased sixfold between 1930 and 1945. At ﬁrst it was thought that these changes
might be due to improved diagnosis and better recording and registration. But
work carried out by Sir Ernest Kennaway in the 1930s and published in 1947, a
detailed examination of post mortem certiﬁcates, helped eliminate occupational
and environmental factors. Kennaway pointed to a connection with cigarette
smoking, but his work, based on statistical correlations, carried little weight.
Laboratory studies also tended to support the connection. Research had also been
undertaken before the war in Nazi Germany and by the American biometrician
Raymond Pearl, for the insurance industry. There had been concern about the
high incidence of cancer of the lung among workers in tobacco manufacturing.19
The issue became more urgent post-war and discussions between the Ministry of
Health (MH) and the Medical Research Council (MRC) led to the Council
convening an informal conference on cancer of the lung in February 1947. The
MRC agreed to initiate a large scale statistical study of the past smoking habits of
those with cancer of the lung and of two control groups. Who would take the
work forward was a matter of discussion : both the Social Medicine Unit under
Professor Jerry Morris and Patrick Lawther, who subsequently ran the Air
Pollution Unit at St Bartholomew’s Hospital, were under consideration.20 But it
was the Statistical Research Unit at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical
Medicine (LSHTM) led by Professor Bradford Hill which was chosen to carry out
18 For example, J. Austoker, A history of the Imperial Cancer Research Fund, 1902–1986 (Oxford, 1988),
pp. 186–99; C. Webster, ‘Tobacco smoking addiction: a challenge to the National Health Service’,
British Journal of Addiction, 79 (1984), pp. 8–16.
19 G. D. Smith, S. A. Strobele, and M. Egger, ‘Smoking and health promotion in Nazi Germany’,
Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health, 48 (1994), pp. 220–3; R. N. Proctor, The Nazi war on cancer
(Princeton, 1999), pp. 173–247.
20 L. Berlivet, ‘ ‘‘Association or causation?’’ The debate on the scientiﬁc status of risk factor epi-
demiology, 1947–c.1965’, in Berridge, ed., Making health policy, pp. 39–74: Interview with Pat Lawther
by Virginia Berridge and Suzanne Taylor, Feb. 2003.
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the work and Dr Richard Doll was employed to work on the study. The results,
published in the British Medical Journal (BMJ) in 1950, concluded that there was a
‘real association’ between carcinoma of the lung and smoking and that smoking
was a factor, and an important one, in the production of carcinoma of the lung.
Work by Wynder and Graham in the US had come to similar conclusions. Later
studies carried out by Doll and Bradford Hill and by Cuyler Hammond and
Horn in the US implicated cigarette smoking even further.
Charles Webster has shown in detail how the issue fared over the next seven
years.21A written parliamentary answer from Ian Macleod as minister of health in
February 1954 accepted that there was a connection but that it was not a simple
one.22 When the MRC issued its own report on smoking and lung cancer in June
1957 the MH adopted the argument more fully. The parliamentary secretary to
the MH for the ﬁrst time on 27 June 1957 expressed unambiguous support for the
conclusions reached by Doll and Hill in 1950. Webster locates this sequence of
events in the machinations of the powerful and complex advisory machinery
which stood between the MRC and the MH. The main advisory body was the
Cancer and Radiotherapy Standing Advisory Committee (SAC), reporting to the
Central Health Services Council, which in turn advised the MH. Horace Joules of
the Central Middlesex Hospital, a member of both bodies, was the only person
within the advisory committee machinery consistently to press the issue. Palladino
has recently related his stance to a continuing Christian Socialist tradition.23 The
initial government response focused on an MH circular encouraging local auth-
orities to develop health education campaigns on smoking. Further action under
the Labour government of the 1960s saw the banning of cigarette advertisements
on television in 1965, and attempts by the Labour minister of health, the GP
Kenneth Robinson, to introduce legislation to ban cigarette coupon schemes and
to limit other forms of advertising. Health warnings on cigarette packets appeared
in 1971.What issues lay behind the nature of the initial response in the 1950s and
early 1960s? The response in the 1950s will be discussed separately from that in
the 1960s when new factors came into play.
I I I
The initial response to the putative link between smoking and lung cancer came
at a time of reorientation in post-war public health and in modes of investigation.
The medical oﬃcer of health in local government, once perceived as the potential
linchpin of the coming state-funded health service, had been downgraded by the
establishment of the hospital and GP dominated National Health Service (NHS).
21 Webster, ‘Tobacco smoking addiction’.
22 Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, 12 Feb. 1954, 523, cols. 173–4, written answer from Ian
Macleod, minister of health.
23 P. Palladino, ‘Discourses of smoking, health, and the just society: yesterday, today, and the
return of the same?’, Social History of Medicine, 14 (2001), pp. 313–35.
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At a broader level, the nature of health problems was changing. It was chronic
rather than epidemic or infectious disease which was to dominate, and chronic
disease epidemiology would emerge as the primary technical tool for the study of
such conditions within populations. The social medicine movement, which had
been important both before and during the war as a possible ‘new avenue’ for
medical practice, was changing its emphasis in the 1950s to a reliance on chronic
disease epidemiology. This epidemiological technique was to become the foun-
dation of a ‘new public health’ in the 1960s and 1970s when public health prac-
titioners were relocated in health services, moved out of the local authorities
where they had established their pre-war empires.24 Jerry Morris’s key text, Uses of
epidemiology, published in 1957, set the tone for the emergence of the new scientiﬁc
approach and the new role for public health (to be known as community medi-
cine) ; the text used smoking extensively as its exemplar.25 The ﬂuidity of the
smoking science was thus embedded in a more general period of reorientation
both within public health and in the ideology and the technical tools of the ﬁeld.
The 1950s and 1960s were also a period when science emerged as an international
enterprise. The post-war establishment of the World Health Organization
(WHO) was important as a mechanism for the cross national transfer of ideas and
concepts in health, and for the development of internationalism in science,
building, to some degree, on earlier attempts through the pre-war League of
Nations. British and American researchers and scientists began to become more
aware of each other’s work in these years.
The 1950s thus saw a ﬂuid policy situation and the government response was
conditioned by a number of factors, not all of them directly smoking related. The
nature of the evidence which the epidemiological studies presented in the 1950s
has been much discussed by historians in recent years in ways which have drawn
on both the science studies and the ‘delay and blame’ frameworks. Debates over
the American response to smoking/lung cancer research illustrate these argu-
ments. In the American context, Allan Brandt and John Burnham have seen the
smoking/lung cancer ‘discovery ’ and subsequent events as a watershed in the
acceptability of chronic disease epidemiology to provide legitimate forms of
scientiﬁc explanation; this was a major paradigm shift towards epidemiology and
statistical modes of explanation and causation at the expense of laboratory sci-
ence.26 Mark Parascandola has argued that it was not simply a case of blanket
opposition between two styles of science. He has related the discussions, in the US
context, to the politics of the National Institutes of Health in the 1950s and to
24 For discussion of these changes, see J. Lewis, What price community medicine? The philosophy, practice
and politics of public health since 1919 (Brighton, 1986) ; D. Porter, ed., Social medicine and medical sociology in the
twentieth century (Amsterdam, 1997) ; V. Berridge, ‘ Jerry Morris ’, International Journal of Epidemiology, 30
(2001), pp. 1141–5. 25 J. Morris, Uses of epidemiology (Edinburgh, 1957).
26 A. Brandt, ‘The cigarette, risk and American culture’, Daedalus, 119 (1990), pp. 155–76;
J. Burnham, ‘American physicians and tobacco use : two surgeons general, 1929 and 1964’, Bulletin of
the History of Medicine, 63 (1989), pp. 1–31.
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controversy between biostatisticians and epidemiologists.27 Talley et al. have ar-
gued that there was a legitimate scientiﬁc controversy over smoking and lung
cancer in the 1950s and early 1960s which reached its denouement and codiﬁ-
cation in the surgeon general’s report of 1964.28 However, these historical pos-
itions have been complicated by the involvement of historians in the litigation
through which US smoking policy primarily proceeds. Brandt, for example, has
modiﬁed his position recently to place great stress on the role of the tobacco
industry, in legal testimony given on behalf of anti-tobacco interests.29
The American story was part of the internationalization of science in the 1950s.
In the 1940s Hill and Doll were not aware of the parallel research being carried
out by Wynder and Graham, but in the 1950s contacts between British and
American epidemiologists developed rapidly. There were national diﬀerences in
the process of consolidation of the science, for example in terms of opposition to
the smoking and lung cancer hypothesis. One key opponent was the statistician
Ronald Fisher, who had played a central role in the development of the RCT.30
Ronald Fisher has been criticized because of his role as adviser to the Tobacco
Manufacturers Standing Committee, set up in 1956 to assist research. In addition,
his eugenic worldview subsequently became unfashionable as a mode of statistical
explanation, although it was a dominant position at the time. Recent evidence
has thrown more light on the nature of this controversy. Fisher’s opposition arose
in part from statistical issues : correlation should not be taken as proof of caus-
ation. But it also emanated from his libertarian views, which meant that he was
strongly against anti-smoking publicity. He thought people should be given the
data and draw their own conclusions ; he criticized Doll and Hill only after an
article in the BMJ had stated that people should be discouraged from smoking.
27 M. Parascandola, ‘Cigarettes and the US Public Health Service in the 1950s’, American Journal of
Public Health, 91 (2001), pp. 196–205; idem, ‘What is an epidemiologist? Biostatistics and epidemiology
at the National Cancer Institute’, unpublished manuscript ; idem, ‘Skepticism, statistical methods and
the cigarette ’, Perspectives in Medicine and Biology, 47 (2004), pp. 246–61.
28 C. Talley, H. I. Kushner, and C. E. Sterk, ‘Lung cancer, chronic disease epidemiology, and
medicine, 1948–1964’, Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences, 59 (2004), pp. 329–74.
29 In a legal case against the Philip Morris tobacco company his testimony argues that in the US
scientiﬁc consensus about the smoking and lung cancer relationship was reached without a doubt in
the mid-1950s and that controversy was only kept alive by the tobacco companies ; these focused on
public relations activity to keep the controversy going. United States District Court for the District of
Columbia, United States of America versus Philip Morris USA INC., United States written direct
examination of Allan M. Brandt, Ph.D. http://www.usdoj.gov/civil/cases/tobacco2/
20040920%20Allan%20M%20Brandt%20Ph.D520Written%20Direct.pdf Accessed 23 Nov. 2004.
Talley and Kushner have worked for the tobacco industry defence law ﬁrms but have withdrawn their
support for US industry legal positions and declare in their article that it is not intended to provide any
support for the industry’s legal case.
30 R. A. Fisher, ‘Dangers of cigarette smoking’, BMJ, 2 (1957), p. 43. In the same volume, see also
idem, ‘Alleged dangers of cigarette smoking’, pp. 297–8; idem, ‘Lung cancer and cigarettes ’, Nature,
182 (1958), p. 108; idem, ‘Cancer and smoking’, Nature, 182 (1958), p. 596; idem, Smoking, the cancer
controversy : some attempts to assess the evidence (Edinburgh, 1959) ; J. B. Fisher, R. A. Fisher : the life of a scientist
(New York, 1978).
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This view of what was termed ‘propaganda’ was common at the time and in-
formed the early health education responses.31
The issue of inhalation also divided the researchers, since, paradoxically, it
seemed that fewer smokers who inhaled developed lung cancer.32 There were
threats of libel. Bradford Hill had oﬀered data to Fisher from the 1952 study he
and Doll had carried out, but not from the 1950 study. Fisher accused the re-
searchers of suppressing evidence.33 This controversy was played out in a number
of publications and also taken up by other authors. The closure of scientiﬁc
controversy on the issue of causation came ﬁnally through Bradford Hill’s pos-
tulates, published in 1965 when Hill was president of the section of Occupational
Health of the Royal Society of Medicine. Hill had ﬁrst begun to develop the
criteria for cause and eﬀect and association in the late 1930s and had expanded
them in a lecture at Harvard in the 1950s.Their publication in the 1960s for-
malized guidelines for causal inference and marked the closure of the main period
of controversy. In a recent paper, Luc Berlivet has taken the British story and
looked at the controversy surrounding smoking and lung cancer and its key role in
the formation of the modern science of epidemiology. He argues that
there was more to criticism of supporters of the ‘causal hypothesis ’ than just a reaction of
rear guard scientists and vested interests plotting to undermine a promising, if young,
scientiﬁc practice … The controversy stirred up by the publications on the relationship
between tobacco and lung cancer was eventually transformed into a highly positive
retrospective story. This is a process which reminds us of other famous episodes of ‘dis-
covery’ in the history of science.34
This scientiﬁc debate had an eﬀect on the policy response of civil servants and
others in government. After the publication of the second Doll and Hill report in
December 1952, the Imperial Tobacco Company, the main British tobacco
company, entered the fray and papers from both sides were circulated to the SAC
in February 1953. As a result, the conﬂicting evidence, from Doll and Hill and
from Geoﬀrey Todd, assistant manager in the statistical department of the
Imperial Tobacco Company, was submitted to a committee chaired by the
government actuary, Sir George Maddox, later that year. The civil servants in
the MH were uncertain. Sir John Charles, the chief medical oﬃcer (CMO), told
Percy Stocks, chief medical statistician to the Registrar General’s Oﬃce, ‘As
regards the evidence, I am in general agreement with what you say, but what I
31 V. Berridge and K. Loughlin ‘Smoking and the new health education, 1950s to 1970s ’, American
Journal of Public Health, 95 (2005), pp. 956–64.
32 This was the view at the time, although subsequently it was shown that all cigarette smokers
inhaled, even if unconsciously. Thanks to Walter Holland for a comment on this point.
33 This sequence of events is detailed in I. Chalmers, ‘Fisher and Bradford Hill : theory and prag-
matism?’, International Journal of Epidemiology, 32 (2003), pp. 922–48, the proceedings of a conference
which included recollections from Walter Bodmer, Fisher’s ex student and Sir Richard Doll. This
evidence emerged in response to a question from the author of this article and was subsequently
elaborated by research in the Fisher papers carried out by Peter Armitage and Ian Chalmers.
34 Berlivet, ‘ ‘‘Association or causation? ’’ ’.
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was looking for was evidence apart from the analogous or purely statistical. So far
as I am aware, there is no purely pathological evidence of this long incubation
period in lung cancer. ’35 Neville Goodman, an MH civil servant, cited in an
internal minute the tobacco industry’s opposing research report, the failure of
attempts to show a carcinogen in tobacco, and other causes of the rise in lung
cancer such as smoke pollution.36 Doubts about the scientiﬁc objectivity of
Wynder, who visited the Ministry in 1953, also compounded the issue.
He is a young man ‘ far gone in enthusiasm’ for the causal relationship between tobacco
smoking and lung cancer. (I had been told when I was in New York this spring that he was
the son of a revivalist preacher and had inherited his father’s antipathy to tobacco and
alcohol). The American Cancer Society was very suspicious of his early work for this
reason.37
The statistical panel reported in November 1953, and found that a ‘real as-
sociation’ had been established, with a ‘ strong presumption’ that the real as-
sociation was causal. It might also be dependent on co-factors such as the
urban–rural diﬀerence, occupational matters, and so on, and the report therefore
treated with great reserve the death rates which had been calculated by Doll and
Hill through a section on estimated risks in the 1952 paper. The SAC accepted
this conclusion, recommending that young people should be warned about the
risks of smoking. The government assessment of the state of scientiﬁc opinion was
beginning to become clearer, and it was this development in opinion which led to
the ﬁrst MH statement in the House of Commons in February 1954, followed by a
press conference. Macleod as minister of health made a statement but promised
no further action; there was a need for further research.38 Macleod’s statement
was made as a written parliamentary answer. He chain-smoked his way through
the subsequent press conference, but subsequently gave up his sixty a day habit in
favour of two or three small cigars a day.39 The parliamentary discussions of the
time show similar ﬂuidity in the political appreciation of the health risk. In an
adjournment debate held in March 1953, MPs from across the political spectrum
expressed uncertainty or opposition. Harmar Nicholls, Conservative MP for
Peterborough, expressed the then common view of the dangers of arousing
‘cancer phobia ’ : the fear of cancer could be worse than cancer itself. The report
‘ is more a report of statisticians than a medical report ’. Bessy Braddock, Labour
MP for Liverpool Exchange, drew attention to the urban–rural divide in the
ﬁgures and favoured an environmental explanation. ‘In view of the fact that
35 Sir John Charles to Percy Stocks, 18 Feb. 1953, London, National Archives, Ministry of Health
papers (NA/MH), MH55/1011.
36 Minute from Neville Goodman to Mr Gregson, 12 Mar. 1953, London (NA/MH), MH55/1011.
37 Note by Goodman to Gregson, 28 Oct. 1953, London (NA/MH), MH55/1011.
38 Smoking and lung cancer, report of the statistical panel appointed by the CMO, MH, 6 Nov.
1953; minutes of Standing Advisory Committee, 22 Dec. 1953; draft memorandum to cabinet Home
Aﬀairs Committee, 26 Jan. 1954, London (NA/MH), MH55/1011.
39 R. Shepherd, Ian Macleod (London, 1994), pp. 91–3.
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cigarette and pipe smoking goes on all over the country, it is folly to say that it is
the main cause of lung cancer. ’40
Expert opinion was related to another issue : the role of the tobacco industry.
Here there had been a long history of co-operation in Britain . Tobacco was a key
import during the Second World War and its duty a major source of government
revenue. During the war the industry had been under strict government control
and the Board of Trade appointed Sir Alexander Maxwell, who before the war
had been a leading leaf merchant, as tobacco controller. The industry, in its
relationships with government, was diﬀerent to the US tobacco industry, which
had no such continuing corporate tradition.41 Both Maxwell and Sir John
Partridge of the Imperial Tobacco Company had close and continuing access
to government. Imperial dominated the industry/government relationship in
the UK until the late 1970s. The Imperial Board had been astonished by the
Doll/Hill studies and saw its role as working with government, as it had done
during the war, this time to produce a cleaner product. The US industry, by
comparison, was distant from government, and concentrated from the start on
public relations exercises to counteract the perceived dangers of smoking.42 In the
late 1970s, with changes in the ownership of the industry, Imperial’s dominance
faltered and the role of the US companies in the UK became more signiﬁcant.43
But in the 1950s the close relationship with government was marked by eﬀorts to
deal with the health issue.
The industry provided another source of scientiﬁc expertise, in particular
through its own statistician, Geoﬀrey Todd, whose report had been submitted to
the SAC. The industry also planned to fund research, and had approached both
the MRC and the MH in 1953. Sir Alexander Maxwell, chairman of the Tobacco
Advisory Committee, in a secret memo to Harold Himsworth, secretary of the
MRC, stated his lack of belief in any true association between smoking and lung
cancer. In order to investigate the true causes of lung cancer the committee
wished to covenant £250,000 over a period of seven years. Discussions between
the Treasury and the MH resulted in a compromise whereby the tobacco
company’s gift was to the government, which would then allocate it to the MRC.
This avoided charges of the impropriety of the Council accepting money from an
interested body. The gift was for research into smoking and lung cancer, but also
40 Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, 19 Mar. 1953, lung cancer (smoking) adjournment debate, cols.
333–50.
41 B. W. E. Alford, W. D. and H. O. Wills and the development of the U.K. tobacco industry, 1786–1965
(London, 1973), pp. 399–428.
42 Brandt’s legal testimony gives much detail on this public relations stance. United States District
Court for the District of Columbia, United States of America versus Philip Morris USA INC., United
States written direct examination of Allan M. Brandt, Ph.D. http://www.usdoj.gov/civil/cases/
tobacco2/20040920%20Allan%20M%20Brandt%20Ph.D520Written%20Direct.pdf. accessed 23
Nov. 2004.
43 V. Berridge and P. Starns, ‘The ‘‘ invisible industrialist ’’ and public health: the rise and fall of
‘‘ safer smoking’’ in the 1970s ’, in V. Berridge and K. Loughlin eds., Medicine, the market and the mass
media : producing health in the twentieth century (London, 2005), pp. 172–91.
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into the means of removing the harmful elements from the tobacco, when they
were identiﬁed. This was the origin of a long programme of ‘product modiﬁ-
cation ’ research which was of particular signiﬁcance in the 1970s and also fuelled
the work on nicotine carried out in the 1980s and 1990s. The gift was to be made,
so John Boyd Carpenter at the Treasury wrote to the lord president, the marquess
of Salisbury, for research into smoking and lung cancer, and ‘presumably of the
means of removing the elements in the tobacco which may have this eﬀect ’.44
A visit paid to Europe by Dr C. C. Little in 1956 to survey the state of play on
tobacco research and funded by the Tobacco Industry Research Committee, an
American industry organization, provided an outsider’s view of the relationships
between the British industry and government. This again diﬀerentiated the
British and US industries. In the US the industry took a public relations stance
from the outset with a view to defence of future legal actions.45 But the British
industry, Little reported, had no knowledge at all of what had been funded from
its MRC benefaction; industry was not seeking to inﬂuence the course of re-
search. During his visit, Dr Little moved easily between the scientiﬁc cancer
research community, the MH, where he met the CMO, Sir John Charles, and the
Imperial Tobacco company oﬃces and laboratories in Bristol. He advised the
British industry that it should follow the US model and set up a co-ordinating
committee to fund research. His idea was that it could be an MH advisory
committee. In the event the manufacturers set up in 1956/7 the Tobacco
Manufacturers Standing Committee, subsequently renamed the Tobacco
Research Committee, which opened its own laboratories in Harrogate in 1962
after the MRC benefaction had come to an end. The industry did not make a
secret of its connections and referred to the US industry research committee in its
ﬁrst published report.46 There was criticism of the US industry from the British
side, which was uneasy with the American industry’s public relations approach.47
The tobacco industry connection was also a concern for government because
of the revenue implications. In February 1954 Macleod as minister of health made
a statement to the Commons which relayed the advice given by the SAC. This
statement was made, as Herbert Brittain of the Treasury put it, ‘ in language
which was in no way dangerous or embarrassing to us from the revenue point of
view’. Macleod himself had commented with cheery cynicism in a letter to Boyd
Carpenter at the Treasury in January 1954, ‘we all know that the Welfare State
and much else is based on tobacco smoking’.48 Tobacco tax was an important
44 Letter from John Boyd Carpenter to marquess of Salisbury, 8 Feb. 1954, London (NA/MH),
MH55/1011.
45 Little to Hartnett, 25 Apr. 1956, Council for Tobacco Research Collection http://legacy.library.
ucsf.edu/cgi/getdoc?tid=dqf1aa00&fmt=pdf&ref=results.
46 TobaccoManufacturers Standing Committee, First annual report for the year ended 31 May 1957, refers
to the close links with the US Tobacco Industry Research Committee, pp. 3–4.
47 Duncan to Hartnett, 15 May 1956, Council for Tobacco Research Collection, http://legacy.
library.usf.edu/cgi/getdoc?tid=xpf1aa00&fmt=pdf&ref=results.
48 Letter from IanMacleod to John Boyd Carpenter, 29 Jan. 1954, London (NA/MH), MH55/1011.
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part of government revenue (16 per cent of central revenue in 1950) and signs of
further movement on the causal hypothesis later in the 1950s evoked Treasury
anxiety. A supplementary answer given by Robin Turton from the MH on 5
March 1956, where he said there was a causal connection, brought forth enquiries
from the Treasury ; had there been more developments since 1954? Sir John
Hawton, the MH permanent secretary, replied soothingly,
needless to say, we are very conscious of the close Treasury interest in this subject and that
is one of the things which governs the guarded sort of statements which we have so far
made … If there is any question of our being driven to say more than we already have on
this subject, we shall of course only do it in consultation with you or your people … I have
a strong feeling that we are going to be put under more and more pressure to give more
positive warnings to the public – and particularly from our own Central Health Services
Council and its Medical Committee … Until then I don’t think there is anything we need
do and I think that the best policy is to keep the subject as quiet as we are allowed to.49
But the matter was not allowed to remain quiet. It was referred to the full cabinet,
where it was decided that Turton should make a restrained statement in the
Commons. Macmillan as chancellor of the Exchequer wanted this held back
until after the budget. His diary entry for 19 April 1956 read, ‘Cabinet 11.45,
Singapore, British Guiana; medical views on the dangers of smoking. If we
lose Singapore, it’s a terrible blow to all our Far Eastern interests. If people
really think they will get cancer of the lung from smoking it’s the end of the
Budget ! ’50 Politicians at this period were generally cynical about the whole
smoking issue, apart from its economic implications. Macleod told a House of
Commons questioner who wanted an American report on smoking and lung
cancer published as a White Paper, that dozens of reports, all claiming to be
authoritative, were being published. ‘ If my hon. Friend is a heavy smoker and is
concerned about the connection between cancer of the lung and smoking, I
would recommend him to give up reading. ’51 Macmillan commented about the
statement to be made in 1956 by the minister of health, ‘Cabinet approved a
statement to be made by the Minister of Health about Tobacco and cancer of the
lung. It was a much better draft than the original one. I only hope it won’t stop
people smoking! ’52
Economic issues were not the only political consideration. Smoking was pol-
itically diﬃcult for government, but so too was air pollution, with which the
smoking–lung cancer issue intersected. The issue was also scientiﬁcally conten-
tious. The text of a TV broadcast on the subject in 1953 after publication of the
Doll/Hill research on smoking and lung cancer in 1950 gives a sense of the
focus on both individual and environment. Introduced by Charles Fletcher,
49 Sir John Hawton to Hubert Brittain, Treasury, 15 Mar. 1956, London (NA/MH), MH55/2232.
50 H. Macmillan, The Macmillan diaries : the cabinet years, 1950–1957, entry for 19 Apr. 1956, ed.
P. Catterall (London, 2003), p. 551. 51 Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, 15 July 1954.
52 Macmillan, Diaries, entry for 23 May 1956, p. 556.
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later famous for his pioneering Your life in their hands, the programme was called
Matters of medicine.53 Dr Guy Scadding, taking part, expressed the views clearly :
smoking cannot be called the cause of lung cancer, since non-smokers also get the disease,
and moreover the increase in cigarette smoking is not likely to be the only cause of the
increase in the lung cancer death rate. The eﬀect of smoking cannot explain the diﬀerence
in mortality between town and country dwellers. Perhaps the eﬀect of air pollution is
another factor. If the eﬀects of smoking and general pollution of the air … reinforce each
other, I think that most of the known facts about the incidence of lung cancer can be
explained.54
This scientiﬁc uncertainty also caused diﬃculties at the political level, in the
negotiations which took place in 1957 between the cabinet committee on cancer
of the lung, which was appointed in that year, and the MRC, which planned to
issue a statement on the causes of lung cancer. The minutes of the cabinet com-
mittee show that both the potential of the smoking issue and the issue of air
pollution included in the MRC draft statement were matters of alarm – but that
air pollution was more central.
The MRC, so it was reported to the cabinet committee, had for the ﬁrst time
come to the conclusion that the smoking of tobacco had a direct causal re-
lationship to lung cancer and therefore there was no alternative but to publicize
their conclusions. It was the proposed inclusion in the MRC statement that up to
30 per cent of lung cancer might be caused by air pollution which caused the
greatest political alarm. This would give air pollution, the minutes record, ‘un-
warranted prominence’. The committee thought that Professor Bradford Hill
and Dr Doll had failed to show any substantial diﬀerence in risk among non-
smokers in greater London and in rural areas. So the politicians asked the MRC
to re-examine their statement. Both statements, so it was commented, had obvious
political implications.55 On 31 May 1957, Lord Home, the lord president of the
council (responsible for the MRC), reported back on the changes made in the
statement. The MRC had re-examined their draft and proposed to modify
the references to atmospheric pollution which implied that it might be responsible
for up to 30 per cent of such deaths. The section would read instead, ‘on balance
it seems likely that atmospheric pollution plays some part in causing the disease,
but a relatively minor one in comparison with cigarette smoking’. A further sec-
tion was modiﬁed to read, ‘A proportion of cases, the exact content of which
53 For the signiﬁcance of this programme, see K. Loughlin, ‘ ‘‘Your life in their hands’’ : the context
of a medical-media controversy ’, Media History, 6 (2000), pp. 177–88.
54 Matters of medicine, 3, 12 Jan. 1953. In an interview, Dr Scadding later recalled how Doll had put
him up to make this broadcast because he did not want to do it. Scadding was the ‘respectable front ’, a
comment which indicates the status of issues round this scientiﬁc claim. Guy Scadding, interview with
Sir Gordon Worstenholme, London, Royal College of Physicians (RCP), RCP/Oxford Brookes video
interview collection.
55 Minutes of ﬁrst meeting of the cabinet committee on cancer of the lung, 7 May 1957, London,
National Archives, cabinet papers (NA/CAB), CAB 130/127/GEN 588.
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cannot yet be deﬁned, may be due to atmospheric pollution. ’56 The pollution
issue was eﬀectively headed oﬀ. The 1956 Clean Air Act, passed after the great
London smog of 1952, was just on the statute book, but had been widely criticized
for failing to deal with industrial pollution and for only dealing with smoke.57 This
episode showed that, although government was wary about the smoking and lung
cancer case as a policy issue, it was inﬁnitely preferable to air pollution. That was
the issue which government did not want reopened.58
The politics of health education funding and control were also involved.
Health education had traditionally been conducted by the Central Council for
Health Education (CCHE) established in 1927, the successor to the British Social
Hygiene Council, the interwar voluntary body which had conducted health
education campaigns. During the war publicity had been a central responsibility
of the Ministry of Information but after the war responsibility was again passed
back to the local authorities who were to rate-fund the CCHE’s work. Central
government had no wish to resume funding of these activities as discussions of
smoking publicity made clear.59 But there were also other reasons why there was
reticence about health education. An MH statement in May 1956 explained why
central publicity would not be the right thing.
The considerations on publicity concerning smoking and lung cancer diﬀer slightly from
those on cancer publicity generally in that the special point – that people might give up
smoking – is not a matter of reporting symptoms. It does however concern an individual
decision which involves others to a very much smaller extent than the subjects of past
central public health campaigns.60
Smoking, it argued, was not a ‘disease ’ in the way cancer or indeed infectious
disease was. It might lead to disease, but not for many years. The notion of long-
term ‘risk ’, as we have seen, was not yet central to public health in the 1950s.
Publicity would be asking people to curtail a habit which was deeply embedded in
everyday culture. It might also raise public fear about cancer, which the Ministry
56 Memorandum by secretary of state for commonwealth relations and lord president of the
council, 31 May 1957, London (NA/CAB), CAB/130/127/GEN 588.
57 R. Parker, ‘The struggle for clean air ’, in P. Hall, H. Land, R. Parker, and A. Webb, eds., Change,
choice and conﬂict in social policy (London, 1975; repr. Aldershot, 1988), pp. 371–409. See also Roy Parker’s
comment and oral history in the transcript of the witness seminar on the smog of 1952 in
www.lshtm.ac.uk/history. V. Berridge and S. Taylor, eds., The big smoke : ﬁfty years after the 1952 London
smog (London, 2005).
58 In 2002, at a conference of European environmental epidemiologists held on the ﬁftieth anni-
versary of the ‘great London smog’ members of the audience informed the author that it was almost
impossible to research air pollution and lung cancer because it would be seen as undermining the
smoking and lung cancer case. This was not an issue of government funding, rather the ‘climate of
opinion’ about research priorities which prevented such initiatives.
59 Public health propaganda; smoking and lung cancer: publicity policy, 1957–1960, London (NA/
MH) MH55/2203.
60 Tobacco smoking and cancer of the lung, brief for adjournment debate, 1 Mar. 1957, London
(NA/MH), MH55/2220.
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had been concerned to damp down. Unfounded cancer phobia might generate a
demand for services at a time when NHS costs were becoming a political issue.61
Conservative politicians were concerned about the implied role of the state.
R. A. Butler, lord privy seal, commented in May 1956, ‘From the point of view of
social hygiene, cancer of the lung is not a disease like tuberculosis ; nor should the
government assume too lightly the odium of advising the general public on their
personal tastes and habits where the evidence of the harm which may result is not
conclusive. ’62 This is a theme which emerged consistently throughout the political
discussions. Politicians were worried about the implications of the ‘nanny state ’.
As the minutes of the cabinet committee on smoking record, ‘The Government
should not seek to intrude into the sphere of an individual’s personal responsi-
bility. It was however, important to stress this element of personal choice since
direct government action was excluded. ’63 The focus was also quite diﬀerent from
traditional public health campaigns. One civil servant pointed out that any
campaign would have to be directed to men (who were the majority of smokers)
rather than women and children who were the more usual objects of public
health attention.64 It was much easier on many political grounds to leave this to
the local authorities.
Lying behind this discussion was the cultural normality of smoking and its
embedding in a range of social customs and practices. This was far from the
simple continuation of the liberal individualism of the gentlemanly culture of
smoking which Hilton has ascribed to this period.65 Tobacco tokens for old age
pensioners were issued by government in the 1950s. Smoking was also a cross-
class activity with its own rituals. The public health researcher Walter Holland
recalled that for many years after the smoking/lung cancer research had been
published, Bradford Hill would keep a box of cigarettes in his room at LSHTM.
When Holland asked him why this was so, Hill was incredulous ; it would be
impolite not to oﬀer visitors a cigarette.66 Norman Brook as cabinet secretary was
equally amazed at a suggestion that government should set trends. ‘Does this
mean that Prime Ministers should not smoke – or at least should not be seen
smoking in public? ’ he wrote in amazement in 1962.67 In the 1970s, when the
researcher Nicholas Wald wished to trace the changes in tar levels in cigarettes
since the 1940s, he was deluged with cigarette stubs and cigarette cases containing
tobacco which grieving widows had kept as mementoes of their dead husbands.
‘His last cigarette ’ had a cultural signiﬁcance which has become ‘hidden from
61 E. Toon, ‘Cancer education in the 1950s’, paper given at the National Institutes of Health
conference on cancer, Nov. 2004, forthcoming in the Bulletin of the History of Medicine.
62 Memorandum by lord privy seal, 1 May 1956, London (NA/MH), MH 55/2232.
63 Minutes of second meeting of cabinet committee on cancer of the lung, 3 June 1957, London
(NA/CAB), CAB 130/127/GEN 588.
64 Minute to Mr Pater on new Medical Research Council statement, 1 Apr. 1957, London (NA/
MH), MH 55/2220. 65 Hilton, Smoking in British popular culture, p. 234.
66 Interview with Walter Holland by Virginia Berridge, 6 Mar. 1997.
67 Norman Brook to Prime Minister, 11 July 1962, London (NA/CAB), CAB 21/4878.
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history’ with the subsequent marginalization of smoking.68 The cultural aspects of
post-war smoking have been surprisingly little researched.69 For the Labour
government of the 1960s these had political implications which will be discussed
below. Thus policy in the 1950s was being formed in a very diﬀerent political and
social climate to that which operated later on. As Doll himself stated in evidence
to the Commons Health Committee in 1999–2000,
In retrospect, it may be surprising that resistance to the idea that smoking caused so much
disease was initially so strong. Three factors, at least, contributed to it. One was the
ubiquity of the habit, which was as entrenched among male doctors and scientists as
among other men and had dulled the sense that tobacco might be a major threat to health.
Another was the novelty of the epidemiological techniques, which had not previously been
applied to any important extent to the study of non-infectious disease. The ﬁndings were
consequently undervalued as a source of scientiﬁc evidence. A third was the primacy given
to Koch’s postulates for determining causation. The evidence that lung cancer also oc-
curred in non-smokers was consequently taken to show that smoking could not be the
cause and the possibility that it might be a cause was inappropriately doubted. The manner
in which lung cancer was linked to smoking was not, however, unique. All the other major
diseases related to smoking were found to be so by epidemiological enquiry and laboratory
evidence of physiological eﬀects that provided plausible mechanisms by which smoking
might cause them was obtained only later and, in some instances, is still awaited.70
I V
The policy environment began to change in the 1960s. There was ‘pressure from
without ’, and there was an incipient policy lobby or policy community on the
issue which linked medical or public health interests within government with
medical interests outside. Within government there was political rethinking of the
issue, although the electoral arguments still remained strong, even for the Labour
government of the 1960s. Above all, a ‘new public health ’ for which smoking was
the central issue, was beginning to consolidate. Even before the Royal College of
Physicians (RCP) published its ﬁrst report on smoking in 1962, there were some
signs of change. Pressure came from Scotland and also from the international
level. Scotland, in this as in other health issues, was often a catalyst for develop-
ments in British health policy more generally.71 Edinburgh carried out an active
68 Interview with Nicholas Wald by Virginia Berridge, 4 July 1996.
69 Rosemary Eliot of the University of Glasgow has been carrying out oral history interviews with
men and women smokers : Women and smoking since 1890 (forthcoming). Other evidence comes from
research carried out by social scientists, for example the pioneering and controversial research by
Hilary Graham on lone mothers smoking: ‘Women’s smoking and family health’, Social Science and
Medicine, 25 (1987), pp. 47–56.
70 Sir R. Doll, ‘Tobacco: a medical history’, appendix 1, memorandum by Health Education
Authority, minutes of evidence taken before the Health Committee, 18 Nov. 1999, p. 26, House of
Commons, session 1999–2000, Health Committee, Second Report, The tobacco industry and the health risks
of smoking, II : Minutes of Evidence and Appendices (London, 2000) 27–II.
71 The impact in the 1980s of HIV/AIDS on British drug policy is another such example.
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health campaign about smoking in 1959, organized by the City Corporation in
response to the MH circular. The impact of the campaign was assessed by the
social survey researchers, Ann Cartwright and Fred Martin, newly arrived with
John Brotherston from LSHTM. Pressure came from the Scottish Oﬃce for a
more eﬀective health education campaign and more extensive government ac-
tion. In June 1961 a memorandum was sent from the Scottish Oﬃce which
stressed the high and rising incidence of lung cancer in Scotland and criticized
government policy. Two main policy options were identiﬁed: a campaign direc-
ted at children and young people; and one directed at the whole population
followed by an increase in the tax on cigarettes. The Scottish Oﬃce favoured the
latter option although recognizing that this would be a new departure in health
policy, one area of several where the public had to be induced to exercise personal
self-restraint.72 Policy models were also being developed at the international level.
In 1959 the relatively newly established WHO published a report on the
Epidemiology of Cancer of the Lung, the report of a study group in Geneva in
November of that year, chaired by Doll. This conﬁrmed smoking as a major
cause of lung cancer and downgraded air pollution. The model of ‘policy trans-
fer ’ is perhaps appropriate here, the transfer of models developed in other
countries (Scotland) or at the transnational level into national policy.73
At the same time a ‘policy lobby’ was emergent on smoking, developing as a
‘policy community ’ in the way in which Jordan and Richardson have delineated
the concept with links into government.74 In the 1950s, there had been no real
interest group or ‘policy community ’ on the issue. Apart from key individuals like
Joules, no signiﬁcant lobby was pushing the anti-smoking case, nor indeed was
there any consistent policy position. The researchers themselves were not activists
in this cause. Although Bradford Hill had worked within government during the
war, he had advised Doll that it was best to steer clear of the political dimensions
of the research. It was his view that a young researcher’s career could be tainted
by an apparent lack of scientiﬁc objectivity.75 Doll’s socialist convictions were
known and he remained a member of the Communist Party until 1957.76 Hill
remarked towards the end of his life that he had made Doll passionate about
statistics as a replacement for left-wing politics.77
In the 1960s smoking became emblematic of a new role for medicine as the
deﬁning voice in the delineation of health risk in post-war British society. George
Godber as deputy CMO was an important ‘ inside ’ inﬂuence. He was quietly
encouraging Charles Fletcher to take the issue through the Royal College as a
72 Memorandum from Scottish Oﬃce, 23 June 1961 (NA/MH), MH55/2227.
73 For discussion of policy transfer, see R. Rose, ‘Ten steps in learning lessons from abroad’,
discussion paper number 1 for ESRC Future Governance initiative, lessons from comparative public
policy, 2001. 74 Jordan and Richardson, British politics, p. 33.
75 ‘Conversation with Sir Richard Doll ’, British Journal of Addiction, 86 (1991), pp. 365–77; interview
with Sir Richard Doll by Max Blythe, Dec. 1986, RCP/Oxford Polytechnic video archive.
76 Letter from Chris Birch, the secretary of Doll’s Communist Party branch, Guardian, 27 July 2005.
77 Interview with Bradford Hill by Max Blythe, 1990, RCP/Oxford Polytechnic video archive.
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way of exerting external pressure on government.78 The need for an outside
‘policy lobby’ was widely recognized in the Ministry. In part this was a way of
convincing the CMO, Sir John Charles, who was reluctant to act, but also for
wider reasons, as a way of giving the issue a signiﬁcance which it might not
otherwise have. Godber wrote to Goodman in July 1961, ‘ I am convinced that a
considerable increase in price would do more than anything else to cut down
consumption but that the pressure to do this should come from unattached
scientiﬁc bodies from the weight of the medical profession … and not from any
oﬃcial sources. ’79 Enid Russell Smith in the Ministry also recognized the need for
an external source of pressure so that government could use that to justify ac-
tion.80 That policy lobby was indeed emergent in the late 1950s and early 1960s,
comprising chest medicine, cancer, and epidemiology; it had moved from the low
status Central Middlesex Hospital, where many of the specialists had been based,
into the medical elite represented by the RCP. Robert Platt as president and his
modernizing agenda for medicine was a key inﬂuence as well as the networks of
Charles Fletcher.81 The role of Godber as CMO provided the link with govern-
ment and to the international level : it was also symbolic that, on retirement,
Godber became the chairman of the Health Education Council, one of the key
institutions which promoted the new public health agenda.
The RCP report for the ﬁrst time provided an agenda for action for this
community. It dropped air pollution as a priority (the committee had originally
been intended to consider both) and provided an alternative package for
government to consider.82 More education of the public ; more restrictions on the
sale of tobacco to children; restrictions on advertising; restriction of smoking in
public places ; increased taxation ; information on tar and nicotine content ; anti-
smoking clinics.83 Here was the agenda to respond to. And this was for the ﬁrst
time a media agenda as well. The College employed a public relations consultant
for the ﬁrst time and held its ﬁrst press conference ; the book sold to the public,
and there was a ‘Panorama’ programme shortly after its publication in March
1962.84 Charles Fletcher’s Penguin special on smoking followed a year later.85
This was a new era in the role of scientiﬁc argument and of the medical lobby. For
the ﬁrst time, science was reaching out to the public and using the full panoply of
78 For discussion of this manoeuvre, see C. C. Booth, ‘Smoking and the gold headed cane’, in C. C.
Booth, ed., Balancing act : essays to honour Stephen Lock (London, 1991), pp. 49–55 and V. Berridge, ‘Science
and policy: the case of post war British smoking policy’, in S. Lock, L. Reynolds, and E. M. Tansey,
eds., Ashes to ashes : the history of smoking and health (Amsterdam, 1998), pp. 143–62.
79 Godber or Goulding (author unclear) to Goodman, 4 July 1961, London (NA/MH), MH
55/2227. 80 Minute from Enid Russell Smith, 5 Feb. 1962, London (NA/MH), MH55/2204.
81 Berridge, ‘Science and policy’, p. 149.
82 RCP, minutes of fourth meeting of committee to report on smoking and atmospheric pollution,
17 Mar. 1960, RCP archive. The committee did reconvene to consider air pollution, but progress on
that issue was much slower and the report was not published until 1970. RCP, Air pollution and health
(London, 1970). 83 RCP, Smoking and health (London, 1962).
84 Interview with Roger Braban, RCP PR consultant, by Virginia Berridge, June 1995.
85 C. Fletcher, Common sense about smoking (London, 1963).
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marketing and consumer oriented techniques which were then emergent in a
post-rationing society. The Cohen Report on health education of 1964 and the
formation of the Health Education Council in 1968 set the seal on the new style of
persuasive public health.86
The politics of the issue also began to change, although this change was less
apparent by the end of the 1960s. Some diﬀerences can be identiﬁed between the
Conservative and Labour governments of this decade, but it was rather a question
of the attitudes of individual politicians rather than one of party political division.
After the publication of the ﬁrst RCP report, the government had set up a cabinet
committee on smoking which held its ﬁrst meeting in the home secretary’s room
in the House of Commons on 28 February 1962. The tempo was diﬀerent. The
MRC was pressing for action. The publication of the report broke a stalemate in
government where policy was in limbo; the Ministry was ‘waiting for the RCP’.
Enoch Powell, as minister of health, had seen a draft of the RCP report and wrote
with characteristic vigour in November 1961 :
The Government has it in its power, without prohibition or interference directly with
anyone’s freedom of choice, to cut cigarette smoking whenever and to whatever extent it
pleases. Indeed, given the probable ﬂatness of the demand curve, they could combine a big
cut in consumption with no reduction, and possibly an increase in revenue. If duty were
increased for explicitly public health reasons, the opprobrium would be much less than
with ordinary increases of taxation, and it would be possible to use a cost of living index
which excluded tobacco (or cigarettes) … In my opinion if the Government is unwilling to
use this power … then health education and all the rest is merely humbug and will be felt
and seen to be such. In any case, ‘health education’ has already gone a long way …
without producing the slightest eﬀect, and I don’t believe advertising makes any diﬀerence
one way or the other.
The publication of the Report will excite temporary interest and for weeks afterwards we
shall have to answer a shower of tiresome Questions about what the Government is not
doing; but unless my colleague is prepared to use the ﬁscal weapon, I personally propose to
indulge in as little humbug as I can get away with.87
David Eccles, as minister of education, was ‘gung ho’ for action, in part be-
cause of his family background.88 But there was in-ﬁghting between the CCHE
and the MH about the responsibility for a health education campaign. Bruce
Fraser, the new MH permanent secretary, was of the opinion that the CCHE
could not conduct a campaign for central government which was distinct from its
role in helping the local authorities with their health education work. The lack of
central government control, when potentially central government money would
be spent, was a basic sticking point. Various institutional alternatives were ex-
tensively discussed, battles which were certainly re-run thirty years later over
86 Discussed in Berridge and Loughlin ‘Smoking and the new health education’.
87 Minute from Enoch Powell, 11 Nov. 1961, London (NA/MH), MH55/2227.
88 His father Macadam Eccles had been a medical temperance supporter and addiction specialist.
See V. Berridge, ‘The Society for the Study of Addiction, 1884–1988’, British Journal of Addiction, 85
(1990), pp. 985–1087.
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HIV/AIDS.89 But the two ministries, health and education, did bring a joint
memorandum to the cabinet committee at its ﬁrst meeting. This called for a
national campaign with further restrictions on the sale of cigarettes to children
and on smoking in public places, restrictions on tobacco advertising, and a dif-
ferential tax on cigarettes.90
Cabinet committees had been brieﬂy formed in the 1950s at the time of the
various parliamentary statements and had been chaired by the home secretary of
the day. Butler as home secretary chaired the ﬁrst meeting of the latest com-
mittee. But Macmillan as prime minister did not want him in this role and
Hailsham as lord president of the council took over. The ministerial committee
was paralleled by one of oﬃcials which did the detailed work. Cary, deputy
secretary in the cabinet oﬃce, was chair of the committee.91A draft report was
ready to go to the lord president by the middle of April.92 The report, preceded by
a ﬂurry of activity in the relevant departments, was relatively anodyne, placing its
reliance on health education and on voluntary agreements for advertising. The
oﬃcials came down against diﬀerential taxation and the taxation option in gen-
eral. This would penalize the poor, raise the cost of living, and have a serious
eﬀect on producer economies such as Rhodesia. It was underpinned by a belief
that more restrictive action could not be sustained without major change in public
attitudes to smoking. The Edinburgh research and the government’s own pilot
survey of public attitudes to smoking through the Central Oﬃce of Information
had conﬁrmed that most people knew about the smoking and lung cancer link,
but their views on why smoking was harmful to health were diﬀerent, laying stress
on the environmental nuisance aspects rather than the risk-based epidemiology.
In the event education and voluntarism were the keynotes of the response and
the committee decided not to make a statement. As Hailsham told Macmillan, a
small publicity campaign would not be welcomed and interest anyway had abated
for the present. He proposed to set up the machinery and start the campaign,
perhaps issuing a statement later on. A meeting with the manufacturers might
also result in an agreement to apply the TV restrictions voluntarily to other
advertising so the government could also claim credit for that.93 At a subsequent
meeting in the House of Lords with representatives of the Tobacco Advisory
Committee, the lord president said the government accepted the scientiﬁc case as
in the RCP report but was against compulsion and action which would lead to
pressure for similar measures in respect of alcohol and even foods like chocolate.
It was ‘not the government’s purpose to induce any catastrophic change in
89 For discussion of the tensions between central and local and over central government control, see
V. Berridge, AIDS in the U.K. : the making of policy, 1981–1994 (Oxford, 1996).
90 Minutes of ﬁrst meeting of ministerial committee on smoking and health, 21 May 1962, London
(NA/CAB), CAB 134/2518.
91 Cary was reluctant to reveal its existence. See note from him to the other oﬃcials on the com-
mittee, 27 Apr. 1962, London (NA/CAB), CAB 21/4648.
92 Minutes of third meeting 13 Apr. 1962, London (NA/CAB), CAB 130/185/GEN 763.
93 Lord president to prime minister, 25 July 1962, London (NA/CAB), CAB 21/4878.
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smoking habits ’. The meeting resulted in a move towards overall agreement on
advertising restrictions based on the code applicable to television. On 14
November, Hailsham wrote to Maxwell. He felt the informal way this matter had
been dealt with was suited to other issues as they arose. But he was clear that he
was no stooge for industry interests. Someone at Carreras had sent him a box of
ﬁlter-tipped Piccadilly. ‘This was indeed bearding the lion in his den, but it was as
ineﬀectual as the devil’s attempt on St. Anthony. ’94
The government response was thus muted and focused on a strategy, health
education, which the health minister recognized as ineﬀective. The multiplicity of
interests in government was a key factor. The Treasury view ultimately prevailed
over the taxation issue but not before the implications had been fully aired at the
political level. The role of the industry was important, although its representatives
were called in after the political decisions had been taken. Also behind these
decisions was a desire to achieve a balance in policy and the realization that,
without a huge change in the social positioning of smoking, there was little point
in initiating a major programme of change.
The publication of the American surgeon general’s report in 1964 led to a
further oﬃcials’ report and political interest. The American report extended as-
sociations between smoking and health risk to diseases other than lung cancer,
but the oﬃcials did not feel this warranted further action. Hailsham received a
draft and was disappointed at their negative conclusions. The Social Survey had
focused on smoking and had shown that attitudes were changing. On 6 April 1964
he wrote, ‘ I consider that the American Report, the American action and the
Social Survey have strengthened the case for action, and that it is not too early to
say that our limited campaign is failing and that unless we can bare our teeth
nothing that we do will be taken seriously. ’ He suggested an extension of the
health education campaign and consideration of banning smoking in cinemas
and advertising, together with a health warning on packets. He also inserted a
signiﬁcant change in the inequality argument deployed by oﬃcials. Now the
words ‘ it would bear more hardly on the poor than on the rich’ were replaced by
‘ it could be harder for a poor man than for a rich man to continue his existing
level of smoking and while this element of discrimination might be said to be
more to the poor man’s beneﬁt, it would be unlikely to go uncriticised’.95 On
30 June the cabinet committee approved the oﬃcials’ suggestion of a modest
extension of the government health education campaign. There was no support
for a ban on TV advertising or on smoking in cinemas. Least opposition was
attracted by packet warnings.
The minister of health in the succeeding Labour government, Kenneth
Robinson, was a doctor who took a more active line on smoking. His meetings of
individual ministers on the matter caused alarm on the part of Burke Trend, the
94 Hailsham to Sir Alexander Maxwell of the Tobacco Advisory Committee, 14 Nov. 1962, London
(NA/CAB), CAB 21/4878.
95 Note from Hailsham, 6 Apr. 1964, London (NA/CAB), CAB 21/5083.
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cabinet secretary, who channelled these through the Home Aﬀairs Committee in
order to stop the proliferation of ad hoc ministerial committees on the boundaries
of home and economic aﬀairs. Trend also promoted the ‘anti nanny state ’ ar-
gument which had carried weight with Conservative politicians.
But on what grounds are the Government justiﬁed in intervening in those cases where a
man’s personal habits may damage only himself? And, if we accept that the Government
are entitled to intervene in such cases, does this argument apply only to a man’s physical
habits, or does it extend also to his mental habits – i.e. to what he reads or watches on
television? In short, where does the argument, if logically pursued, stop?96
But the nature of policy was changing. Robinson promoted voluntary agreements
which led to the disappearance of cigarette advertising from TV. The acceptance
of money from the manufacturers for research was no longer a straightforward
matter. When the issue of resumed industry funding was reopened in the mid-
1960s, various possibilities came under consideration, including an MRC take-
over of the industry’s new laboratory complex opened at Harrogate in 1962, but
nothing came of the contacts.97 Such requests were seen as calling into question
government policy, including the banning of TV advertising of cigarettes.
Electoral considerations about smoking continued to operate, however.
Robinson’s wider proposals were killed oﬀ by Richard Crossman when he moved
to the Department of Health and Social Security in 1968. Both he and the prime
minister, Harold Wilson, were worried about the electoral implications of smok-
ing restrictions. When Robinson presented a draft bill to outlaw cigarette cou-
pons, Crossman’s reaction was brusque. He
simply blurted out that this was another of those Bills which we simply couldn’t aﬀord to
pass when we were running up to an election because bans of this sort made us intensely
unpopular, particularly with children and families. If you’re going to deal with the cigarette
smoking problem, you should not try this kind of frivolous but intensely unpopular meth-
od. There was a tremendously violent reaction with everyone saying that here we must
stand on moral principle. I heard it from Eirene White, Dick Taverne, and Edmund Dell,
representing the Board of Trade which has switched its junior Ministers around, and,
indeed, I only had two or three people on my side. However, I’m still just powerful enough
to hold the thing up and ﬁnally I suggested that instead of forbidding coupons we should
ration the amount of money to be spent on advertising and leave it to the cigarette manu-
facturers to decide how they should spend their money. I found this inﬁnitely preferable.
Harmony achieved.98
It was signiﬁcant that Dell, as minister for the department with close links to the
tobacco industry, supported restriction, not a ‘pro-industry ’ approach. Smoking’s
96 Note from Trend to prime minister, 27 Jan. 1965, London (NA/CAB), CAB 124/1686.
97 26 Aug. 1965, letter from Herbert Bowden to Norman Buchan MP, London (NA/CAB),
CAB124/1686.
98 R. Crossman, The diaries of a cabinet minister, III : Secretary of state for social services, 1968–1970 (London,
1977), entry for 19 July 1968, p. 147.
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signiﬁcance as an electoral issue was changing, although electoral concerns were
still a strong disincentive to action as this incident indicates.
V
By 1971, when the RCP published its second report, much water remained to ﬂow
under the bridge. The end of the 1960s can be see as the ‘end of the beginning’
and a suitable resting point for assessment of the initial policy response. Denial
and delay is an inadequate framework of assessment and policy science theories
are helpful but need historicizing. The changes of the 1950s and 1960s were
symbolic of a wider paradigm shift in the way in which health issues were pres-
ented by and to politicians and the public. A new role for medicine, the pres-
entation of scientiﬁc facts to the public through the media, was an important
component of the changed situation. The medical reports of 1962 and 1964 made
risky behaviour by the public a matter for governments ; and they made smoking
an issue for the public. Politicians were engaged: witness Hailsham, Powell, and
Robinson, who represented an opposite view to those who stressed public opinion.
The policies which emerged reﬂected ﬁscal concerns but also interests like health
education, air pollution, or the state of public opinion. There was a balancing act
across government. The central/local tension over control and ﬁnancing of
health education often occupied ministers’ minds as much as its content. Electoral
considerations were dominant. It would have been unthinkable for governments
to impose the public smoking bans of the early twenty-ﬁrst century in the 1950s.
Network theories are more helpful but need historical development. Networks
changed over time; and they were not so clearly segmented for and against
smoking. The anti-smoking policy lobby, absent in the 1950s, consolidated in the
1960s. The negotiations about the establishment of the RCP committee and its
subsequent report saw the formation of a policy community with links into
government and also with the outside medical constituency. The policy linkages
were more complex than the industry versus public health model. In the 1960s
and after, parts of that lobby also linked with industry round an agenda of ‘harm
reduction’. Historical analysis of post-1945 public health has focused on the or-
ganizational and professional changes which brought the demise of the medical
oﬃcer of health and his rebirth as the community physician within health ser-
vices.99 Alongside that service-focused world, a ‘new public health’ was forming
with an ideology which stressed individual responsibility in the context of popu-
lation-based interventions aimed at persuading the public. This public health was
not centred on the community physician and drew on diﬀerent networks and
strategies to achieve policy change. Smoking was the key issue which acted as the
template for much that followed: it symbolized a new era of health risk and
individual responsibility.
99 As in Lewis, What price community medicine?
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The historical modiﬁcations presented here are also suggestive of the policy
uses of history. Narrowing historical analysis to policy advocacy undermines its
utility for option appraisal. Smoking policies and cultural change have passed
through stages in theUK inwhich diﬀerent relationships have operated at diﬀerent
points in time. Policy formation is messier and more complex than public health
advocates or political science would have us believe. We need to take account of
such historical analysis as a detached basis for discussion of the interaction be-
tween evidence, culture, and regulation and its potential future implications.
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